In 2011 the Government of El Salvador implemented a reform to the gas subsidy that increased the welfare of households in all but the top two deciles of the income distribution. However, the reform turned out to be rather unpopular, especially among winners. This paper relies on ad hoc household surveys conducted before the implementation and in the following two and a half years to test which factors help explain the puzzle. The analysis uses probit and logit models to show that misinformation (a negativity bias by which people with limited information inferred negative consequences), mistrust of the government?s ability to implement the policy, and political priors explain most of the (un)satisfaction before implementation. Perceptions improved gradually-and significantly so-over time when the subsidy reception induced households to update their initial priors, although political biases remained significant throughout the entire period. The results suggest several implications with respect to policy reforms in cases where agents have limited information.
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In 2011 the Government of El Salvador implemented a reform to the gas subsidy that increased the welfare of households in all but the top two deciles of the income distribution. However, the reform turned out to be rather unpopular, especially among winners. This paper relies on ad hoc household surveys conducted before the implementation and in the following two and a half years to test which factors help explain the puzzle. The analysis uses probit and logit models to show that misinformation (a negativity bias by which people with limited information inferred negative consequences), mistrust of the government?s ability to implement the policy, and political priors explain most of the (un)satisfaction before implementation. Perceptions improved gradually-and significantly so-over time when the subsidy reception induced households to update their initial priors, although political biases remained significant throughout the entire period. The results suggest several implications with respect to policy reforms in cases where agents have limited information.
Introduction
The government of your country announces a certain policy change. How do you know if it will benefit you or not? There are many things you may take into account. For example, what do the media and different political parties say about it? Who do you trust? What are your beliefs about the government's capacity to deliver? The list of factors to consider could go on. But what happens when your assessment is wrong? Sometimes winners may believe they are losers. This paper explores empirically one such case. More specifically, it analyzes the determinants of the citizens' satisfaction about a reform of the gas subsidy in El Salvador, a reform that was expected to improve the welfare of around three-quarters of the population but which was initially unpopular.
The theoretical literature has long recognized the potential importance of such scenario. If individuals are uncertain about the benefits of a policy change it can lead to a status quo bias, in which a policy that would benefit the majority of the population is not be adopted (Fernandez and Rodrik [5] ). Under individualspecific uncertainty, an increase in the number of expected winners could reduce the probability that a reform is approved, until it reaches a critical threshold and becomes an overwhelming majority (Jain and Mukand [12] ). More generally, the inability of the policymaker to persuade the electorate of the benefits of a policy change has featured in a large number of political economy models (reviewed by Drazen [4] ). Recently, the literature has turned its attention to the importance that the dynamics of learning about reform outcomes may have on support for reforms (van Wijnbergen and Willems [15] ). Others have pointed out that political support for reforms can vary dramatically over time, which may alleviate the problem of status quo bias because governments may be able to withstand long periods of low popularity, as long as political support recovers before election day (Veldkamp [16] ). While the theoretical literature is abundant, it has proven difficult to identify these effects empirically. 1 This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it documents a case of a reform that benefited the majority of the population but was initially unpopular. Second, it uses new survey data to identify the factors that help explain this puzzle. Third, it analyzes how the main factors driving the popularity of the reform evolved once the reform was implemented. The policy experiment that is the focus of this study is the reform of the gas subsidy implemented in El Salvador in April 2011. In order to do so we rely on six consecutive surveys, one conducted before the implementation of the reform and the remaining five afterwards.
The reform implied the removal of the price subsidy for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) resulting in a price increase for consumers from $5.10 to $13.60 per 25-lbs bottle of LPG, the most common fuel used for cooking by Salvadorans at home. In place of the price subsidy the authorities introduced a monthly income transfer of $8.50 to households with an electricity consumption of less than 200 Kwh per month. This was a relatively high cut-off as around 94 percent of households with access to electricity consumed less than the eligibility threshold. For these households the monthly subsidy of $8.50 (equivalent to a bottle of LPG) was provided through the electricity bill. Households without access to electricity were entitled to a government-issued card that would allow them to collect the monthly $8.50.
Overall, an incidence analysis of the reform suggests that around two-thirds of households benefited from the reform (Tornarolli and Vazquez [13] ). Ex-ante the winners from the reform included two groups. First, households that did not use LPG as cooking fuel and would now benefit from the $8.50 per month. Since LPG use was not as common among the lowest income groups as among the richest this facet of the reform was particularly pro-poor. Second, households who consumed less than one bottle of LPG per month would also benefit from the reform. On the losing side, some of the richest households in El Salvador would become ineligible for the LPG subsidy on account of their high electricity consumption or because they could collect the subsidy for only one of their properties. Households that consumed more than one bottle of LPG per month would also lose out. Nevertheless, the reform proved to be -at least initially -highly unpopular. In January 2011 just one-third of the electorate favored the upcoming reform and in August of the same year less than 45 percent of people declared to be either 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied' about it. The satisfaction rate continued to increase during the following year and a half before stabilizing at around 65 percent, the level observed in our last survey in September 2013.
In our empirical investigation we answer two research questions. First, what are the factors driving the unpopularity of the reform before and in the aftermath of its implementation? Second, what variables account for the relatively high popularity of the reform two years after it was implemented? In selecting potential explanatory variables to include in our analysis we draw from the recent literature on energy subsidies which 3 has suggested a number of common barriers to successful subsidy reform, including lack of information about the magnitude and shortcomings of subsidies and lack of government credibility and administrative capacity (IMF [10] ). Widespread media and information campaigns appear to have played an important role in successful reform efforts in countries such as Ghana, Namibia, and the Philippines, and the need for public information campaigns has been identified as a key lesson learned from country case studies (Vagliasindi [14] ).
Case studies on the political economy of reform in sectors other than energy also highlight the importance of providing information to citizens about the benefits and costs of different policy choices (Fritz et al. [6] ).
Finally, creative solutions such as advanced compensatory payments deposited in new bank accounts for households, have allowed governments to circumvent lack of trust among citizens when implementing subsidy reform efforts as in the case of Iran (IMF [11] ). To the best of our knowledge our paper provides the first empirical test on the role that information and trust in the government capacity play in explaining support for an energy subsidy reform.
We identify three main factors that explain the evolution of the popularity of the reform: the individual's level of information (which is especially relevant ex-ante), his/her trust in the government's ability to implement the reform effectively (or the ability to deliver the subsidy ex-post), and his/her political views. Using Our results -robust to a large set of checks -suggest three main conclusions. We first show that in January 2011 -before implementation -the level of information about the reform, the expectations on the ability of the government to deliver and political priors help explain most of the overall satisfaction rate. On average, around 70 percent of the variance of the dependent variable is captured by our main regressors. Second, we show that the increase in the satisfaction rate over time is essentially driven by the ability of the government to deliver the subsidy. Throughout the five surveys following April 2011 the significance and magnitude of the coefficient identifying the above effect progressively increases. Finally, we show a non-marginal effect of political partisanship in the perception of the reform not only before the reform was implemented but also throughout the entire period of analysis.
Our findings may be useful for those considering subsidy reforms. The starting point of a reform cannot be to assume that accurate information is widely known or that departures from perfect information are un-4 biased. Surveying the extent of information and categorizing attitudes so as to inform any public information campaign are worth undertaking (as suggested by Fritz et al. [6] ). Any efforts at informing the public would then need to be evaluated against that baseline. In some cases the timing of reforms may need to be adjusted if the priors that individuals hold suggest that reform efforts would be premature. In those cases, emphasis could be put first on affecting the information landscape. Piloting of reforms could also help governments test, learn, and adapt their interventions (Haynes et al. [9] ). The timing of releasing information about any upcoming reform is also to be carefully planned to minimize the need for adjustments that could add to the confusion and undermine the credibility of the reform efforts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the details of the gas subsidy reform. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 explains our empirical models. Section 5 presents our results and robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes.
The reform
In April 2011, the Government of El Salvador implemented a substantial reform of the subsidy for gas to improve targeting and to alleviate fiscal pressures. The main element of the reform, as we will see further below, involved eliminating the price subsidy (so that now gas would be sold at market price) and introducing a compensatory cash transfer to eligible households. Liquified petroleum gas (LPG) is one of the most common fuels used for cooking in El Salvador with around 70 percent of households using LPG in their homes. Around 75 percent of all LPG is sold bottled, the form that households consume, the rest being sold in which the subsidy scheme described above was in force, the fiscal cost of the LPG subsidy reached $154 million (or 0.7 percent of GDP). The goal of the gas benefit had been to subsidize domestic consumption by Salvadoran households but leakages happened. Smugglers would buy the subsidized bottles in El Salvador and ship them illegally to neighboring countries which did not subsidize LPG. In January 2011 the market price of a 25-lbs bottle of gas was around $16 in neighboring Guatemala and around $12 in Honduras and Nicaragua. Gas that was legally imported from Guatemala to El Salvador was shipped back illegally to Guatemala after having been retailed for household consumption in El Salvador. The LPG subsidy scheme was also regressive. While 70 percent of all households used LPG for cooking the use was not as widespread among the poor. The exclusion error was high: around 47 percent of households in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution did not receive the LPG subsidy because they did not consume gas. If we restrict ourselves to the bottom decile of income, 67 percent of households did not cook with LPG (Artana and Navajas [1] ). As a result the subsidy was poorly targeted with the households in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution receiving only 27 percent of the entire benefits of the subsidy. Think tanks and international organizations had been highlighting these issues for some time. A 2006 World Bank report argued that "there is no social or economic justification to keep the current gas subsidy" on account of its fiscal cost and the many inclusion and exclusion errors (WorldBank [17] ).
The reform implemented in April 2011 changed drastically the way the LPG subsidy was provided. Instead of subsidizing prices at the point of sale, the new mechanism delivered an income transfer to a large set of eligible households. As a result of this change the consumer price increased from $5.10 (the subsidized price) to $13.60 (the price without subsidy). Individual households received a transfer of $8.50 per month, provided they were eligible. The eligibility requirement was consuming less than 200 Kwh in electricity per month, a criterion that was meant to exclude the highest income brackets of the population from receiving the gas subsidy. Property owners that had two or more properties registered with the electricity company could only collect the subsidy once. Households that lacked electricity needed to register at a governmental office and provide their address so that the household received a card that entitled it to collect monthly the $8.50. No eligibility criteria were required other than providing information to ensure that the household was receiving the subsidy only through one instrument (i.e., through the electricity bill or via the government-issued card).
For those receiving the subsidy through the electricity bill the mechanism was as follows. The subsidy came in the form of a barcode at the bottom of the electricity bill that people had to take to the bank; the teller would then scan the barcode and give the choice to the consumer if they wanted to apply it against the electricity bill or cash it. Most people applied the subsidy to the bill, which then got discounted. For those with the electricity bill under a direct debit scheme (which very few people did), they still had to go to the bank and get the teller to scan the barcode and give them the cash.
It is worth highlighting that the reform had been announced long before its implementation and it suffered a few adjustments along the way. Within the first 100 days after taking office in June 2009 the government announced the intention to "rationalize" or "focalize" the LPG subsidy. However, the plans materialized only in late 2010 when the specifics of the reform described above were introduced to the public. Between December 2010 and February 2011, the eligibility criteria based on electricity consumption was revised (the maximum consumption limit increased from 99kw/h to 200kw/h). The eligibility criteria for individuals without electricity or individual electricity meters did not change, but subsistence business became eligible for the subsidy shortly after implementation began. These groups faced a few challenges for registering and getting the electronic card. Issues frequently raised by individuals include long lines and lack of adequate information at the registration center. These implementation adjustments could potentially have affected individual's views about the reform.
An incidence analysis of the April 2011 reform shows that the new scheme was substantially more propoor than the one in existence until then. First, the poor households that did not use LPG as cooking fuel would now benefit from the $8.50 per month. Second, some of the richest households in El Salvador would become ineligible for the LPG subsidy on account of their high electricity consumption or because they would collect the subsidy for only one of their properties. Based on electricity billing records, around 6 percent of households consumed 200 or more KWh per month. In addition, the incentive to smuggle was removed and consumption of LPG in El Salvador decreased by 15 percent in 2011 compared to 2010, while it increased in Guatemala by 7 percent (CEPAL [3] ).
An important aspect of the reform was that the amount of the subsidy was now limited to $8.50 per month to each eligible household regardless of how many bottles per month the household purchased. Those households who consumed more than one bottle per month would be worse off under the new scheme. This could potentially hurt some of the poor. However, a survey conducted in May 2011 indicated that one 25-lbs bottle of LPG was enough to cover their monthly consumption for 80 percent of households. Among the 20 percent of households for which one 25-lbs bottle was not enough to cover their monthly consumption needs, the majority (almost 70 percent) were households with a monthly income above the average. Finally, since the subsidy was for household consumption, not industrial use, indirect effects on the price level and other second-order effects can be thought of as relatively minor in this case.
To sum up, the incidence analysis suggests that the winners of the reform included the poor that did not use LPG but would now receive $8.50 per month and any household that consumed less than 25-lbs of LPG per month. The losers would be the top 6 percent households in electricity consumption, 2 the owners of more than one property, those households that consumed more than one 25-lbs bottle of LPG per month, as well as the smugglers and the distributors (who saw a decline in volumes). The overall incidence by income decile of the LPG subsidy before and after the April 2011 reform is shown in figure 1 .
The incidence analysis is based on de jure eligibility for the subsidy not on whether people actually received the subsidy. This is an important distinction because it quickly became apparent that a number of households that were entitled to the subsidy did not cash it in. In the estimates of the authorities around 70,000 households did not collect the subsidy even though they were legally entitled to it. While we do not have information on the income level of these households, the anecdotal evidence available suggests that these were households with access to electricity and relatively high income. A common explanation for this surprising behavior is that they did not think it was fair to claim a benefit that was meant for the poor. It is also possible that the benefit was lower that the opportunity cost of cashing it (going to the bank, queing, etc..). As a result, the de jure incidence analysis may underestimate the pro-poor nature of the reform. At the same time it is also possible that some poor households were not well informed about the benefit or were unable to prove their eligibility which would have reduced the pro-poor nature of the reform. However, there 2 Meaning with an electricity consumption higher than 200kw/h. Source: Tornarolli and Vazquez [13] .
is no evidence that a large number of poor households were unduly excluded. Therefore, we believe that on balance the incidence analysis based on de jure eligibility provides a good approximation to the actual direct impact on households.
The puzzle
While the reform benefited a large part of the population (and proportionally more the poor) it initially proved to be highly unpopular. tremendously the price of gas for domestic use." 5 Other analysts also agreed that the gas subsidy reform had "hurt" the FMLN.
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Even more puzzling than the overall lack of popularity was the fact that the reform was particularly unpopular among the poor. For example, in January 2011 among those respondents in the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution only 28 percent were satisfied while among those with an income in the top decile almost 50 percent were satisfied with the reform. Overall, the satisfaction of respondents that were expected to benefit from the reform was no different from the satisfaction of those that were expected to lose (see table 1) 7 .
Yet the puzzle faded over time, slowly but surely. The popularity of the reform improved substantially but only after many months of implementation. The evolution of satisfaction rates is shown in figure 2.
While in January 2011 only 30 percent of people were satisfied with the upcoming reform by August 2012 it more than doubled to 66 percent. This pattern was observed also among the poor, who went from a 28 percent satisfaction rate in January 2011 to 68 percent in August 2012. In short, it took many months before the reform became popular among the majority of the population. In May 2011 the overall satisfaction with the reform was better but still low at around 40 percent, even though by then households had been receiving the benefit under the new scheme for two months. It appears that people's negative priors about the reform were only slowly adjusted.
Data
This study uses data from 6 waves of household surveys conducted by 'La Prensa Gráfica', the largest newspaper in El Salvador. The survey reflects the regular practice of that institution of polling people's views on political and social issues. As discussions about the proposed subsidy reform had become a contentious political issue the newspaper decided to start polling, devoting a module of its periodic survey to the reform.
3 It is also worth noting that under the new scheme churches were not eligible for receiving the benefit. 7 A t-test fails to reject the null that the satisfaction rate among 'losers' is statistically different from the one of 'winners'. the subsidy, or how often it is distributed), and questions about the mechanism through which the benefit was received (whether it was received through the electricity bill or electronic card or withdraw in cash or not). These two sets of variables are used as part of the robustness checks, to verify if, even years after the implementation, there are misconceptions about the benefit, and whether issues such as salience play a significant role (table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the satisfaction rates across surveys). A descriptive analysis of the satisfaction with the reform indicates no obvious links between being a winner (loser) of the reform and being satisfied (unsatisfied) with the reform. Through out the surveys a simple t-test fail to reject the null that the satisfaction rates are significantly different across groups (e.g. between losers and winners). Also, the overall lack of popularity of the reform does not appear to differ significantly across a range of characteristics such as income or the source of fuel for cooking. For example, the approval of the reform was highest among the richest respondents to the survey conducted in January 2011 (around 50 percent of those in the top 15 percent of income were satisfied with the reform compared to 30 percent for rest of the sample) but the reform turned out to be more popular among poor people in later surveys (for instance in May 2012). Males appear slightly more favorable than females at any point in time but again, not significantly so. Unsurprisingly, there was a visible difference across education levels in January 2011 (more educated people resulted more favorable to the policy change) but already in May 2012 the difference across levels was not significant.
Rather, the level of information about the reform appears to be associated with the views of the respondents. Most of the respondents had limited information and acknowledged it so. In January 2011 only 18 percent of people considered themselves to be well (or very well) informed about the policy change. The lack of information was also reflected in the fact that only 15 percent of the respondents correctly identified the true price of LPG in the absence of a subsidy. Around 25 percent of the population did not know what the price without subsidy would be and a further 22 percent underestimated it by more than five dollars (see figure 3 ). It is noteworthy that those that considered themselves to be informed had different priors about the consequences of the reform (see table 3 ).
Among those respondents that were well-informed (top panel of table 3) the satisfaction with the reform was relatively high at 54 percent (compared to 24 percent among the badly informed). Among the wellinformed 46 percent mentioned that the reform would have at least one positive effect, for example improving the lives of the poor. At the same time, those well-informed were also able to come up with negative effects at a similar rate (45 percent mentioned at least one negative effect). In contrast, among those that were badly informed (bottom panel) only 13 percent mentioned any positive effects while 69 percent were able to identify a negative consequence.
The finding that the uninformed came up more easily with negative than positive consequences of the reform may be related to what is known in the psychology literature as negativity bias or positive-negative asymmetry. While the concept refers to a broad range of psychological phenomena it has also been found to apply to information processing. In a survey of the extensive literature on the issue, Baumeister et al. [2] conclude that 'bad information is processed more thoroughly than good'. This may help to explain why some survey respondents could come up with examples of negative impact more readily than for positive impacts. It is worth stressing that the survey results suggest that information about the reform is linked with a lower negativity bias. Satisfaction with the reform also differed depending on the respondents' trust in the government's intention and ability to deliver on the proposed reform. In particular, satisfaction with the reform was higher among those respondents who thought that the government would be able to deliver on its promise (42 percent) than among those who had no trust (22 percent). Satisfaction with the reform was also higher among those leaning politically with the government (44.1 percent) than among those who favored the political opposition (18.9 percent). This may reflect the well-established fact that people assimilate information in a way that is skewed in the direction of support for their antecedent beliefs (Glaeser and Sunstein [7] ). In our context, such biased assimilation of information may simply take the form of supporters of the political party in government paying more attention to or believing the positive aspects of the reform proposed by their party.
While our dataset provides unique information about individual's perception and knowledge about the subsidy reform, it has a few caveats worth mentioning. First, the surveys are not a panel, but separate cross sections. We are no able to track changes in satisfaction for the same individual in different periods, and have to rely on change in representative samples of the population. Some variables, such as the level of information of the respondent about the reform, are not included in the intermediary surveys, which prevents us from following its evolution in time. Finally, different surveys were collected in different times of the year, and some control variables such as income or occupation could have been affected by seasonality. It is unlikely that our main variables of interest (satisfaction, information, access to the benefit, and political partisanship) are significantly affected by seasonal effects.
The empirical model
In Following the nature of our dependent variable we employ a Probit (Logit) model estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques. Our baseline model can be formally expressed as
where ↵ i is a constant term, ✓ and are vectors of coefficients, X i is a matrix containing controls describing personal characteristics of the respondent, Z i is a matrix of geographical dummies, and " i is an error term.
The coefficients of interests are 1 , 2 and 3 . The models are run twice, the first time specifying a probit regression while the second a logit regression. Following the classical approach of limited dependent variable regressions, we report (for the two main surveys: January 2011 and September 2013) the marginal effects of the three main regressors keeping all other variables at their mean values. Finally, in order to overcome the traditional issues of the R 2 in probit/logit models, for each regression we report two alternative measures of goodness of fit: the percent of correctly predicted (PCP) observations 9 and the 'receiver operating characteristic' (ROC) curve that overcomes the arbitrarily PCP cutoff to classify the observations.
Results
The results of our baseline regressions are reported in table 4 Y i , second classify as a '1' any observation with a predicted probability higher than 0.5; finally, the PCP measure is calculated as P CP = (100 · Correct P redictions) /N where a correct prediction arises if b
two specifications: the first one including a constant term only and the second one including all controls.
We start the description of our results by considering the January 2011 survey (table 4 PROBIT results in blue, LOGIT results in red.
Complementary statistics (PCP, ROC, AIC, and BIC) refer to Probit regressions. 
Robustness checks
In order to further validate the main results, this section proposes a number of robustness checks considering different samples, alternative definitions for the variables of interest and additional controls. Given the number of questions of the surveys, we run our checks using the January 2011 and September 2013 surveys.
All tables containing robustness check results are shown in AppendixA.
The first set of checks considers different samples, including the observations omitted in the baseline (those for which the respondent replied 'NS/NR'). We treat these individuals as unsatisfied and assign a value of '0' in the corresponding entry of the dependent variable. 10 The These results suggest that the marginal effect induced by political partisanship (either in favor or against the governing party) is a non trivial contribution to satisfaction.
We further check our definition of 'information'. The baseline case considers 'informed' those individuals who explicitly answered to be 'informed' or 'well informed' about the subsidy reform. This robustness check exercise redefined the variable 'Information' using a different question in the 2011 survey. This variable reflects whether the respondent is informed not only about the reform but also about the unsubsidized gas price, or in other word, the value of the subsidy. In this check the variable 'Information' is the same dummy variable as in the baseline however it is conditional on knowing the correct unsubsidized price. The respondent is considered informed about the unsubsidized price if his/her answer is less than 3 US$ away (in both directions) from the 'true' price. This choice is more restrictive than the baseline case. While in the baseline 216 people are considered as 'informed', in this robustness check only 121 are considered so.
The results of the regressions with the more restrictive definition of 'Information' are reported in table A.12.
The focus in this case is on the coefficient of the variable 'Information'. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient is slightly lower than in the baseline but the estimates remain significant at one percent level in all models. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of the other two regressors remain highly significant. We also consider a bigger error band (5US$) and report the results in table A.13. The baseline scenario is confirmed also in this case.
Finally, we consider a slightly different definition to the variable 'Delivery'. In the baseline analysis for the January 2011 survey, the variable 'Delivery' is a dummy variable taking the value of '1' if the respondent declares to be confident about receiving the subsidy under the announced new scheme. However, it could be the case that the respondent answers 'no' because she or he does not quality for the transfer. This robustness exercise considers under the variable 'Delivery' only individuals with a monthly usage of electricity below the qualifying threshold, i.e. those that qualify for the benefit. This choice reduces the number people confident in the delivery (meaning the number of observations taking the value of '1') from 373 (baseline) to 305. The results are reported in table A.14. The coefficient of 'Delivery' is only marginally lower than in the baseline but the variable remains significant at one percent level. Overall these results suggest that the baseline findings are fully robust to the alternative definitions of delivery, information, and partisanship and that these variables play an important role in individuals' satisfaction.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the determinants of the citizens' satisfaction about a reform of the gas subsidy in El Salvador. The reform was expected to improve the welfare of around three-quarters of the population but turned out to be highly unpopular. Our contribution is double. First, using newly collected data on six consecutive surveys we document the evolution of the popularity of the reform across individuals. Second, using Probit/Logit models we test the marginal effects of three key observables: the individual's level of information (which is especially relevant ex-ante), his/her trust in the government's ability to implement the reform effectively (or the ability to deliver the subsidy ex-post), and his/her political views. We first show that in January 2011 -before implementation -the level of information about the reform, the expectations on the ability of the government to deliver and political priors help explain most of the overall satisfaction rate.
On average, around 70 percent of the variance of the dependent variable is captured by our main regressors.
Second, we show that the increase in the satisfaction rate over time is essentially driven by the ability of the government to deliver the subsidy. Throughout the five surveys following April 2011 the significance and magnitude of the coefficient identifying the above effect progressively increases. Finally, we show a non-marginal effect of political partisanship in the perception of the reform not only before the reform was implemented but also throughout the entire period of analysis.
Overall our findings suggest that the level of satisfaction with the reform could potentially have been affected by actions to increase the information of individuals. It is important to stress that such efforts could have played a role without necessarily modifying the content of the reform. In this sense the findings of our paper point to issues that go beyond the political economy of reform as it is often understood, i.e., in the sense of identifying winners and losers. Our paper suggests that exploring factors that may affect why an individual considers himself to be a winner or a loser is an under-studied yet worthwhile effort for understanding the success or failure of policy reforms.
AppendixA. List of control variables -robustness checks
We control for all observables contained in the surveys. Most of the variables that we use as controls are dummies constructed from answers to questions contained in the surveys. For each variable in table A.7 we specify whether it is a dummy variable, the number of dummies created for each variable and whether the variable is included when running our model on a specific survey. As usual, to avoid collonearity issues, the number of dummies for each variable is equal to the number of possible answers minus 1 (e.g. gender is a single dummy for males). 
